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Abstract
We examine the effect of joint custody on marriage, divorce, fertility and female
employment in Austria using individual-level administrative data, covering the en-
tire population. We also use unique data obtained from court records to analyze the
effect on post-divorce outcomes. Our estimates show that joint custody significantly
reduces divorce and female employment rates, significantly increases marriage and
marital birth rates, and leads to a substantial increase in the total money transfer
received by mothers after divorce. We interpret these results as evidence against
Becker-Coase bargains and in support of a mechanism driven by a resource redistri-
bution that favors men giving them greater incentives to invest in marriage specific
capital.
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1 Introduction
With a substantial proportion of children in many industrialized countries expected to live
apart from one of their parents before reaching adulthood, child custody after divorce is
of considerable concern not only for the parties directly involved (i.e., children, mothers,
fathers, lawyers, and judges) but also for society at large.
Most of what we know about child custody comes from studies by legal scholars (Maid-
ment 1984; Mason 1994; Maccoby and Mnookin 1997). This literature argues that the
‘best interest of the child’ — the key legal principle that underpins custody allocations
in most countries around the world — is indeterminate, in the sense that it gives exces-
sive discretion to judges to impose their own value judgements about which parent might
better serve the child’s interests. The same literature argues also that this indeterminacy
exacerbates the inefficiencies of parents’ allocative decisions at the time of divorce. Such
studies, however, do not substantiate this conjecture with reliable quantitative evidence.
Economists, instead, have paid scant attention to child custody issues. Weiss and
Willis (1985) were the first to formulate a model where divorce settlements, which specify
alimony transfers and the allocation of custody rights, are determined within the mar-
riage, when parents and children still live together. Divorce settlements have efficiency
consequences after divorce, because the non-custodial parent cannot costlessly monitor
the allocative decisions of the custodian. They have, however, no efficiency consequences
within marriage because — in line with Coase theorem (1960) — spouses are assumed
to be able to write down complete contracts on intrahousehold allocations of resources,
whereby they can commit to a binding system of side payments well before the marriage
eventually breaks down. Rasul (2006a) and Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) question this
assumption and develop incomplete-contracting models that allow custody rights to have
efficiency implications even within marriage.
The early empirical economics literature on divorce has also neglected the assignment
of custody rights and its effects on household behavior (e.g., Becker, Landes, and Micheal
1977). Weiss and Willis (1993), Del Boca and Flinn (1995), and Garfinkel et al. (1998)
analyze divorce settlements among couples in which the mother has sole (physical and
legal) custody, explicitly assuming that all the salient allocative decisions concerning
children must be made or approved by her. This assumption is justified on the basis
that sole maternal custody has been the dominant custody arrangement in the 1970s and
1980s, the period over which the data used in such studies were collected. Although this
assumption may not be tenable in more recent years, three findings from this research
are relevant to our work. First, alimony and child support transfers are found to increase
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with husband’s income and to decline with wife’s income, although their overall size and
sensitivity to income are small. Second, child support orders are institutionally set at
low levels both because higher orders might lead to noncompliance and because courts
are likely to place a high weight on non-custodians’ (fathers’) welfare. Third, divorce
transfers are sufficiently low to reduce child expenditures and welfare substantially.1
Only recently have we witnessed increased interest in the effects of child custody on
family behavior. The evidence, however, is still scant and it is primarily for the United
States and takes advantage of the time difference in the introduction of joint custody
reforms across states. For instance, Del Boca and Ribero (1998) provide correlational
evidence according to which nonresidential parents with joint custody transfer more re-
sources to children in addition to those ordered by courts. More recently, Halla (2013)
shows that the introduction of joint custody led to an increase in marriage rates, overall
fertility, and divorce rates as well as to a decrease in female labor market participation,
male suicide rates, and domestic violence. Another example is the work by Allen, Nunley,
and Seals (2011), which finds evidence that joint custody reforms increased the probability
of receiving child support payment among divorced mothers.2
This paper, for the first time, examines the effect of joint custody on marriage, divorce,
fertility and female employment in Austria. It has at least two original data features.
First, it primarily relies on large individual-level administrative data, covering the entire
population. Second, it uses unique data obtained from court records, which have never
been utilized before to investigate child custody issues and which allow us to analyze the
effect of custody reform on the bargaining arrangements within divorcing couples. Unlike
previous studies, our identification strategy does not rely on time and space variation in
the introduction of the custody reform. Rather, it is based on a difference-in-differences
design, which takes advantage of the individual level information of the data. For instance,
to analyze the effect of joint custody on marriage formation, we rely on the possibility that
couples with women who have passed childbearing age and have no dependent children
are not affected by the reform. This allows us to identify the effect of the reform on
treated couples, i.e., couples with women in childbearing age or couples with dependent
children. We shall perform several sensitivity exercises to check whether our results are
robust to alternative definitions of childbearing age.
1The research on the effect of unilateral divorce laws also disregards custody allocations, and focuses
instead on how and to what extent the adoption of such laws have affected divorce rates (e.g., Friedberg
1998; Wolfers 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2007), family violence, suicide and spousal homicide (Stevenson
and Wolfers 2006), or education, family income, marriage and labor force participation of individuals
exposed to unilateral divorce regulations as children (Gray 1998; Gruber 2004).
2In addition, contrary to Halla’s (2013) results, Nunley and Seals (2011) document that joint custody
leads to higher rates of labor force participation among married mothers.
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Another important feature of our paper is that we rely on economic theory to in-
terpret our empirical results. On this we follow Becker (1993) who suggested that the
Coase theorem (1960) provides the natural framework to evaluate the effect of changes
in the legal environment on family behavior. (See also Stevenson and Wolfers 2006; Ra-
sul 2006b.) We develop a simple conceptual framework based on the influential works
by Clark (1999), Fella, Mariotti, and Manzini (2004) and Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss
(2007), which examine the impact of changes in the law on divorce rates and allocations
within marriage. In particular, Chiappori and colleagues emphasize the prominence of
the Becker-Coase argument, according to which changes in divorce laws should not affect
divorce rates. Our study is also related to the recent analysis by Lafortune et al. (2011),
which examines the effect of a reform granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples in
Canada. Their empirical work is embedded on a collective household model in a matching
framework that predicts that changes in alimony laws affect existing couples differently
from couples-to-be. In particular, they find that for couples formed before the alimony
reform, obtaining the right to petition for alimony led women to reduce their labor force
participation, but for newly formed cohabiting couples, this result does not hold.
We extend such earlier contributions to analyze the case of the effect of changes in
the legal custody of children after divorce. In line with the Becker-Coase argument, our
framework allows us to show that, if changes in the custody law which determine divisions
of property rights conditional on marital status can be undone by individual recontracting,
then such legislative changes should not affect the incidence of divorce. We can also show
that the change in custody laws should not affect the joint expected utility from marriage
and therefore the entry into marriage and the likelihood of having children.
If Coasean bargains are not attainable, however, divorce, marriage, fertility, and female
labor force participation rates can be influenced by changes in the child custody legisla-
tion. This is because custody allocations are expected to affect the share of the marital
surplus that each partner gets in marital bargaining, and this in turn affects each partner’s
investment incentives both in the marriage state and in the divorce state. We illustrate
two mechanisms that might underpin such influences. The first hinges on a relatively
greater investment made by parents (especially fathers) during marriage. The argument
is that joint custody arrangements give fathers greater incentives to invest within mar-
riage than the sole custody rule, because they expect they might receive a larger share
of control rights over their children. If this is the case, joint custody redistributes con-
trol rights in a way that is favorable to men. A result of this redistribution of control
rights is that men may be willing to transfer resources to their former partners even after
4
divorce, e.g., in the form of greater alimony payments. The second mechanism mirrors
the first, in the sense that fathers are less likely to make marriage specific investments,
since they expect to receive some share of their children’s time anyway, as a result of the
joint custody that the reform entitles them to. Our empirical results along all margins
(i.e., divorce rates, marriage rates, marital and nonmarital fertility, female labor force
participation, and post-divorce outcomes) provide evidence of non-Coasean bargains and
are broadly consistent with the first mechanism driven by greater parental investments
and a redistribution of control rights deemed favorable to men.
2 The 2001 Joint Custody Law Reform in Austria
Austria long admitted the termination of marriage by mutual consent on the basis of
irretrievable breakdown, irreconcilable differences and incompatibility. Unilateral divorce
was introduced in 1978 (Boele-Woelki et al. 2003; Gonza´lez and Viitanen 2009), allowing
either partner to force a dissolution of the marriage without the consent of the other.
Despite this, mutual consent was (and still is) necessary to find an agreement on a number
of important issues, with courts playing an active role in proposing and formulating a
settlement. One of such issues is child custody arrangements.
Before July 2001, parents with a dependent child (aged 18 or less) had to agree on a
sole custodian upon divorce. If no agreement was reached, the court assigned sole custody
to one of the parents. This decision was (at least partly) based on the principle of the best
interest of the child, which emphasized the importance of the continuity of the parent-
child relationship and aimed at minimizing disruptions in the child’s life, such as reducing
the chances of a change in school, neighborhood and social networks, and of a decline in
living standards (Mnookin 1975). This legal environment, therefore, permitted only two
alternative custody arrangements, maternal or paternal sole custody.3 About 90 percent
of the children whose parents divorced in the decade before the reform lived with their
mothers after divorce and the remaining 10 percent lived with their fathers.
On July 1, 2001, the Austrian government introduced a custody law reform, which
changed the standard focal arrangement from sole custody to joint custody of dependent
children. Courts, however, grant joint custody only if parents agree on it as well as on the
child’s primary residence (physical custody). If parental agreement on physical and joint
custody is not reached, then the judge, who is randomly matched to couples, assigns sole
3Exceptionally, custody could have been assigned to a party other than parents (e.g., grandparents or
close relatives). Cases of nonparental custody, however, were and continue to be rare, and therefore we
do not consider them in the analysis below.
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custody on the ground of the best interest of the child.
With the 2001 reform, therefore, there exist four different settlements, the two sole
custody allocations as in the pre-reform period and two joint custody allocations, one in
which the mother has physical custody and the other one in which the child co-resides with
the father. Since the introduction of the reform, the distribution of physical custody has
been virtually identical to the allocations observed before the reform, with 91 percent of
dependent children living with their mothers and about 9 percent living with their fathers.
But now nearly 44 percent of all children have parents who agreed on joint custody and
more than 10 percent of these children co-reside with their fathers.
The Austrian Parliament started the public discussion of the reform on September 27,
2000. The bill was discussed and approved almost two months later by the lower house
and then confirmed by the upper house on December 14, 2000. It was officially published
on December 29, 2000, and became law on July 1, 2001. In this context, therefore, there
seems to be little room for announcement effects (Blundell, Francesconi, and van der
Klaauw 2011).4 It is possible, however, that Austrian parents had already considerable
information about joint custody at their disposal at the time of the reform, since Austria
was a late adopter and several public debates on child custody took place before, especially
when Germany introduced joint custody in 1997.
In addition, parents who wanted to end their marriage at the time of the parliamentary
debates but were unhappy with sole custody arrangements might have had an incentive to
prolong their union for about 6–9 months before filing for divorce and obtaining custody
under the new regime. This may lead to spuriously longer pre-reform marriage durations
and a spike in the divorce rate immediately after the reform. Empirically, we shall see
if this is borne out by the data. We will also take this possibility into account in our
sensitivity analysis by pre-dating the reform to September 2000 (and not July 2001),
when the bill was first introduced in Parliament.
4A content analysis of the major Austrian newspapers reveals that media coverage of child custody
issues was 4 to 5 times greater between September and December 2000 — that is, 6 to 9 months prior to
the implementation of the reform — as compared to the coverage during the preceding eight months of
2000. Exposure to relevant information therefore was greater, but parents who preferred the pre-reform
settlements could still opt for sole custody even after the reform and, thus, they did not have to hasten a
decision before July 2001. Similarly, couples who were childless and unmarried at the time of the public
discussions had no incentive to move their family decisions forward because the reform expanded their
choice set and did not abolish pre-reform settlements.
6
3 Child Custody Rules and Household Behavior
Divorce
A child custody reform that shifts the standard custody allocation from sole custody to
joint custody transfers a well-defined control right — the right to care for own dependent
children5 — from the spouse who would have received custody under the sole custody
arrangement (usually, the mother) to the other partner. Our analysis draws from earlier
works by Clark (1999), Fella, Mariotti, and Manzini (2004) and Chiappori, Iyigun, and
Weiss (2007), which have focused on the allocative consequences of the introduction of
unilateral divorce.
When marriage is formed, spouses are uncertain about the quality of the match and
their future productivities in the market and nonmarket sectors. When these random
variables are realized, spouses re-evaluate their decision to marry and decide whether or
not to stay married. Even if the marriage ends, they can still transfer resources to each
other. For instance, among couples with children, child expenditures are collective goods
(Weiss and Willis 1985) and transfers from the non-custodial parent to the custodian can
be made with the intention of increasing child welfare.
Let M be the utility possibility set which is defined by the combined resources of the
couple when married. If the union dissolves, the couple’s total resources determine the
utility possibility set that can be achieved under divorce. As in Mnookin and Kornhauser
(1979) as well as in the models above, couples bargain in the shadow of the law, with
the law defining — conditional on the marital state — what each partner is entitled
to. But unlike the studies mentioned above, the legal background is that of unilateral
divorce, both before and after the 2001 reform (see Section 2). Clearly, the introduction of
joint child custody rights may affect the collection of possibilities faced by each divorcing
partner. Thus, the position of the utility possibility set after divorce depends on the
custody rights over children. We label DS and DJ the sets determined under sole custody
and joint custody, respectively.
The boundaries of M , DS, and DJ determine their Pareto frontiers. These are denoted
by BM if partners are married, BS if they divorce and children are allocated under the
sole custody rule, and BJ if, when the union dissolves, children are allocated according
to the joint custody law. Figure 1 illustrates an example of such Pareto frontiers, where
uh and uw are the utility levels of male and female partners respectively. If married, the
5In our setup, child care comprises a broad range of parental behaviors. It includes the provision and
satisfaction of basic child needs (such as food and health care) as well as decisions over important aspects
of the child’s life (such as school choice, cultural upbringing, and moral values).
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couple will reach an efficient agreement on the allocation of resources along BM giving a
utility pair denoted by m∗.
Consider the case in which the divorce law allows only for sole custody (as in the
pre-reform period in Austria) and assume that the custody legislation gives preference to
the mother.6 If in the divorce state the couple’s resource allocation is given by s∗, then
s∗ /∈M , and with unilateral divorce, the marriage cannot be saved and the outcome is s∗
(Clark 1999).
Now consider a world where only joint custody is available for divorcing parents.7 The
move from sole custody to joint custody essentially transfers some of the control rights
over children from the default custodian (i.e., the mother) under the sole custody regime
to the non-custodial parent (i.e., the father). Assume j∗ is the efficient agreement attained
by the spouses along BJ if they divorce. In this case, j
∗ ∈ M . Therefore, even if the
father might benefit by a unilateral divorce, there will generally exist a range of marital
allocations that make both partners better off compared to j∗. The couple will then
renegotiate the initial allocation within marriage, m∗, and the renegotiation will have to
provide the husband with a payoff within marriage that exceeds what he would get if they
divorce. The final outcome will be located along BM to the northeast of j
∗.
In this example, the introduction of joint custody reduces the likelihood of divorce.
But the availability of joint custody does not always guarantee this outcome. In Figure 1,
in fact, the opposite result occurs if the intrahousehold equilibrium allocations in divorce
are s′ when children are assigned under sole maternal custody and j′ when they are
allocated according to joint custody law. In this case, therefore, the switch from sole to
joint custody leads to an increase in the risk of divorce.
Figure 1 illustrates also the case implied by the Becker-Coase argument in our en-
vironment. Suppose the divorce allocations are either (s′, j∗) or (s∗, j′). In both cases,
whether divorce occurs or not depends not on the custody law, but on the relative size
of the gains and losses from divorce. Moving from sole to joint custody rights, therefore,
affects neither the allocation of resources nor the incidence of divorce.
Determining which of these three results emerges is an empirical issue that will be
addressed in the subsequent analysis.8 To guide the interpretation of our empirical find-
6The position of BS in Figure 1 reflects the pre-reform situation according to which the overwhelming
majority of divorced children lived with their mothers.
7As noted in Section 2, if spouses cannot agree on joint custody, judges will allocate sole custody to
one of the parents (typically the mother). Thus in reality and in the data, as in most other institutional
environments, joint custody is likely to coexist with sole custody.
8Of course, the likelihood of divorce could remain unchanged if investments and shocks offset each
other. In that case, the resulting outcome is observationally equivalent to what predicted by the Becker-
Coase theorem, even if this is actually violated. This is why we submit our statistical analyses to a range
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ings, however, it is important to have an insight into some of the economic mechanisms
that might be at work when joint custody arrangements replace sole custody rules. If
Becker-Coase bargains are attainable, spouses will renegotiate the marriage contract and
commit to a binding system of side payments (possibly from the mother to the father,
as the divorce legislation becomes more favorable to fathers) irrespective of the initial
distribution of property rights.
If the shift from sole to joint custody implies a move from s∗ to j∗, the divorce agree-
ments under sole custody become inefficient under the new joint custody rule and there-
fore, as in the Becker-Coase framework, are renegotiated. A shift to j∗ may be driven by
a relatively greater investment made by the father during marriage: ceteris paribus, joint
custody arrangements give fathers greater incentives to invest within marriage than the
sole custody rule, because they know they will receive a larger share of control rights over
their children (Halla 2013). The same shift can occur with the realization of marriage
specific shocks that make marriage more valuable to the wife, as in the Chiappori-Iyigun-
Weiss (2007) setup. It is the wife who, in the marriage contract renegotiation, must be
willing to accept a redistribution of resources to dissuade her partner from seeking divorce,
moving from m∗ to somewhere to the northeast of j∗ along BM .
Conversely, if the joint custody reform leads to an increase of the divorce rate as implied
by a move from s′ to j′, the shift might be driven by a combination of a redistribution
of resources and the realization of marital shocks that give the father enough bargaining
power that the mother cannot compensate within marriage despite a relatively lower
marriage specific paternal investment.
Marriage, Fertility, and Mother’s Labor Supply
The shift from sole to joint custody may influence other behaviors that the Becker-Coase
theorem would predict to remain unaffected. The argument based on redistribution fa-
vorable to fathers and greater paternal investment during marriage, which is associated
with a reduction in the divorce rate, may lead to an increase in the likelihood of marriage.
If joint custody gives fathers a greater share of the marital surplus and thus greater in-
centives to invest in marriage specific capital, this expands the marital surplus and, all
else equal, more perspective partners will find marriage a desirable option.9 By the same
argument, if children are one of the results of such marital investments, the reform may
of sensitivity checks where we aim to uncover such offsetting forces. We also investigate the existence of
heterogeneous responses among specific subgroups of the population.
9For ease of exposition, here and in what follows we assume that the realization of match specific
shocks does not offset the investment decisions made by parents.
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also induce a positive effect on the probability of having children among married couples
relative to the probability of out-of-wedlock births.10
Conversely, if the move to joint custody is accompanied by reduced incentives for
paternal investment, then the reform may discourage the formation of marriages charac-
terized by a lower marital surplus. Likewise, the probability of marital births is expected
to decline relatively to the probability of out-of-wedlock births.11
Finally, the custody reform might affect specialization within the family. Custody
laws that make divorce less likely, as it might be the case of the joint custody legislation
if it triggers greater father’s investments and a redistribution of resources that reflect his
changed bargaining power more closely, may lead to more specialization as evidenced by
lower maternal employment.12 This argument is similar to Gray’s (1998) and Stevenson’s
(2007) insights on the effect of the introduction of unilateral divorce laws.13 By contrast,
less specialization (i.e., higher maternal employment) is consistent with custody laws that
heighten the risk of divorce, such as joint custody if it is associated with lower paternal
investment or sole maternal custody and with a resource redistribution that is favorable
to women (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002). Specialization, in fact, which means that
one spouse specializes in the market sector and the other specializes in the nonmarket
sector, leads to skills that are complementary within a marriage, but are likely to be
less productive when single or imperfectly transferable to another union. Specialization,
therefore, may be a costly strategy if partners live in a world with a greater risk of marital
dissolution.
Divorce Transfers and Legal Cost of Divorce
When going through a divorce, spouses must settle on child custody and the division of
joint property. As mentioned in Section 2, all divorces in Austria are arranged through a
court settlement with the active involvement of a judge. This is costly. The Becker-Coase
argument, which hinges on costless bargaining, is unlikely to be useful to characterize post-
10To the extent that parents face a quantity-quality tradeoff, the reform may not induce a shift in
relative birth rates, but could lead to greater investments in children who live with legally married
parents. Since we do not have data on child quality, however, we cannot investigate this implication.
11This mechanism echoes what Alesina and Giuliano (2007) call ‘dilution effect’ in their analysis of the
effect of unilateral divorce laws on fertility, according to which the value of marriage goes down, because
it is cheaper to dissolve it, and thus people are less likely to marry and marital fertility decreases because
an easier divorce law lowers the propensity to invest in children. Since fewer people marry, they may also
choose to have children out of wedlock.
12To the extent that fathers’ labor supply is more inelastic than mothers’, the larger paternal investment
in marriage specific capital does not necessarily coincide with lower employment or reduced hours worked
by the father.
13For similar insights on the impact of innovations in birth control technologies on intrahousehold
allocation of resources, see also Oreffice (2007) and Chiappori and Oreffice (2008).
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divorce interactions in such circumstances. But, conditional on divorce, the mechanism
based on differential marriage specific investments could provide us with different testable
predictions on divorce settlements.
Suppose the introduction of joint custody is accompanied by more marriage specific
investments, which lead to a lower risk of divorce. If nonetheless divorce occurs, since for
example marriage specific shocks make the union relatively less favorable to the husband,
fathers are expected to transfer more resources to their children and ex-wives. This is
because the marginal value of such transfers is greater as they have invested more during
marriage. Of course, there are different types of transfers (e.g., alimony and child support
payments), and husbands — over and above the awards prescribed by the judge — may
not want to increase all of them.14 But the total value of the transfers is expected to go
up. If instead shared access to children through joint custody is associated with a greater
chance of divorce and lower marital investment, we expect to observe a reduction in total
divorce transfers from husbands to wives.
Another component of the settlement is the legal cost of divorce. Besides the actual
monetary expenses incurred during the divorce, other aspects that contribute to the cost
are the length of the divorce process and the number of post-divorce trials. If joint custody
implies increased marital investments, the legal cost of divorce is expected to go down
(i.e., shorter length of the process and fewer trials), since a relatively larger marriage
specific capital makes each parent more likely to continue investing in children. If instead
joint custody sets off lower marital investments, ex-spouses are expected to go through
lengthier divorce processes and to face more post-divorce trials.
Caveats on the Empirical Analysis
Four points are worth keeping in mind in the empirical analysis that follows. First, the
two non-Coasean effects we just described (higher and lower parental investment effects)
could operate differently in different groups of the divorcing population or the reform
may have a different salience for different couples. The net aggregate effect then might
be zero, but not because the reform did not have an impact on couples’ lives. This is why
we perform several robustness checks and try to uncover the presence of heterogeneous
responses to the reform in different subsets of couples.
Second, in 2000/2001 Austria went through a severe, albeit short, economic crisis.
Although there is evidence that adverse family-level economic shocks, such as the job
14Other forms of transfers, including property transfers, gifts and informal cash transfers, are only
imperfectly recorded in our data.
11
loss of a husband and negative financial surprises, increase the probability of divorce
(Weiss and Willis 1997; Bo¨heim and Ermisch 2001; Charles and Stephens 2004), we
have no reason to expect that the 2000/2001 downturn affected the likelihoods of divorce
among families with children differently than among families without.15 But to the extent
that children imply greater constraints on mothers, mothers’ labor market and fertility
decisions might have responded differently to that crisis than other women’s. We therefore
shall perform sensitivity analyses that are based on different comparator groups of women.
Third, our results must be seen within the broader context of other family policies in
Austria that might have influenced family decisions. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and
Lalive et al. (2011) show that maternity leave reforms introduced in the 1990s and in 2000
had substantial effects on fertility decisions, in the sense that they increased the likelihood
that mothers who give birth to their first child immediately after the reform had more
second children than pre-reform mothers. Interestingly, however, Lalive and colleagues
show no effect on mothers’ labor market outcomes in the medium run, despite an impact
on the time on leave. As the next section makes clear, our identification strategy assumes
that, other than the introduction of the custody reform, there are no contemporaneous
shocks that affect the relative outcomes of the treatment and control groups. The shorter
spacing between first and second born induced by the maternity leave reforms implies
an effect on the intensive margin of fertility but not its extensive margin suggesting our
groups have not been differentially affected, and the lack of an employment response in
the medium term is reassuring in relation to our labor market analysis.
Fourth, if the reform had an effect on marriage and divorce, then selection into mar-
riage and divorce may change as a result. In the case of the marriage selection, which
is relevant for post-marriage outcomes, we shall compare our baseline results with those
found from a reduced sample that includes only marriages formed before the reform. An-
ticipating our results, we find that our estimates are not sensitive to this change. We
thus conclude that compositional effects are likely to be of minor importance in this case.
For the selection into divorce, instead, there is no straightforward way to separate out
treatment from compositional effects. This means that some of our estimates on post-
divorce outcomes (see Section 6) may also reflect a compositional variation in the group
of divorced couples, although other estimates based on instrumental variables models are
less likely to be affected by compositional effects.
15Recent studies find less clear results (e.g., Hankins and Hoekstra 2011) or provide evidence of pro-
cyclical divorce rates (e.g., Hellerstein and Morrill 2011).
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4 Data and Methods
Our empirical analysis uses unique, high-quality administrative data drawn from three
national registers, the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), and official civil courts
records.
Register data
The three registers are the Austrian Marriage Register (AMR), the Austrian Divorce
Register (ADR), and the Austrian Birth Register (ABR). The AMR collects data on
the universe of marriages in the country.16 Besides basic socio-demographic data, it
contains information on the date of the marriage, the location of the registry office where
the marriage is recorded, the district in which each spouse resides, and spouses’ age at
marriage.
Compiled by district courts, the ADR has records of all divorces. This register collects
data on spouses’ age, number and age of children, the location of the registry office where
the marriage was recorded, the location of the court that grants the divorce, and the legal
grounds on which the divorce is conferred.
The ABR contains all birth records in Austria. Each record has data on child and
parents’ birth dates, mother’s residence and nationality, her marital status at the time of
the child’s birth, and the date and location of the marriage if the mother is married at
the time of birth, allowing us to establish whether a child is born out-of-wedlock or not.
The three registers give us the universe of births, official marriages and divorces oc-
curred in Austria from January 1995 to December 2005 for an annual average of approxi-
mately 39,000 marriages, 19,000 divorces and 77,000 births over this period.17 The unit of
observation in our empirical analysis will be at the district level.18 We therefore construct
monthly series by treatment status of divorces, marriages, and births for 120 districts.19
This gives us a sample of 31,680 observations (=120 districts × 12 calendar months × 11
years × 2 groups). In the case of births we have a sample size of almost 17,000, owing to
16The data are gathered by about 1,400 local registry offices. In Austria, a marital union gains legal
status only when it is recorded by a registry office. Private religious ceremonies that are not collected in
the marriage register do not confer legal status.
17The birth data are over a shorter time period, from July 1998 to December 2005. The reason, which
is imposed for identification purposes, will be discussed below.
18An individual level analysis of marriage and divorce decisions in fact will require full knowledge of
the stock of the married/unmarried population in Austria, which we do not have from the registers.
19During the sample period, Austria encompassed 98 districts with Vienna, its largest district, having
a population of about 1.6 million in 2005 accounting for almost 20 percent of the entire population. For
analytical purposes, then we divided Vienna into its 23 municipal districts and treated these as separate
districts. This leads to the 120 districts used in the analysis.
13
the shorter time period over which fertility decisions are examined.
With such data, we analyze the effect of the reform on each outcome estimating the
following difference-in-differences (DiD) specification
ydt = α0 + α1Tdt + α2I(t ≥ s) + (α31 + α32Tdt)δt + α4γd + βI(t ≥ s)Tdt + εdt, (1)
where d refers to district and t to time measured in months from January 1995 (or July
1998) to December 2005. The term I(z) is a function indicating that the event z occurs,
δt is a vector of time (year) dummies, γd is a vector of district dummies, and εdt is an
i.i.d. error shock with E(εdt|Tdt, t) = 0 and where E(·) is the mathematical expectation
operator. Equation (1) allows for different intercepts (when α1 6= 0) and differential time
trends (when α32 6= 0) for treatment and control groups.
The dependent variable is the monthly number of group-specific divorces, marriages,
and births per district expressed as a fraction of the corresponding overall cell mean. The
term Tdt is an outcome-specific treatment group. In the case of divorce, the treatment
group is defined by couples with at least one dependent child and the control group by
divorcing couples without dependent children. Thus, Tdt is equal to 1 for the observations
from the series on monthly number of divorces by treated couples, and is equal to 0 for
the observations from the series on the monthly number of divorces by control couples.
To identify the effect of joint custody on divorce without confounding it with the impact
of the changing composition of the married population (an effect driven by the potential
selection into marriage), we shall also consider a variant of (1) in which we only consider
divorces among married couples formed before the introduction of the reform.
When marriage is the outcome of interest, the treatment group is defined by couples
with at least one dependent child or by childless couples in which the wife is aged 45 or less
at the time of marriage. The control group comprises couples without dependent children
and with women aged more than 45. The rationale behind these definitions is that only
women of childbearing age or women with dependent children were potentially affected
by the introduction of the custody reform, while childless older women were not. The
term Tdt therefore is equal to 1 for the observations from the monthly series on marriages
by couples with treated women, and is equal to 0 for the observations from the monthly
marriage series in which women are from the control group.
In the case of births, there is no obvious comparison group. Our identification strategy
then relies on comparisons with neighboring Germany as a control. In particular, we use
births in the 96 Bavarian districts as control for the treatment that characterized births
which occurred in the 120 Austrian districts. It is worth stressing that, besides sharing the
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language, the main religion, and a border of about 500 miles, Austria and Bavaria have
historically strong political and economic links, which lasted for centuries until the end of
WWI and shaped highly comparable legal institutions and social norms on nuptiality and
illegitimacy (Knodel 1967; Shorter 1978). For robustness, we will also limit the analysis
to the 64 bordering districts only, 45 for Bavaria and 19 for Austria. We restrict our
analysis to the period following July 1998, since Germany (including Bavaria) introduced
joint custody at that point in time. Our results, however, do not change if the analysis is
performed over a longer period.
As mentioned earlier, we will experiment with alternative definitions of treatment
and control groups for all outcomes, in the attempt of detecting heterogenous responses
by different groups of the population and more broadly assessing the sensitivity of the
estimates to such changes.
Our treatment effect is measured in (1) by β. In line with the arguments developed in
Section 3, a value of β different from zero implies a departure from Becker-Coase bargains.
In the case of marriages and births, a positive value of β is consistent with a mechanism
that operates through greater marriage specific investment; so too if β is negative in the
case of divorce. Evidence of lower marital investments instead will emerge if we find the
opposite values of β for the two sets of outcomes respectively.
The three outcome variables described so far are shown in Figure 2 by treatment status.
For both treatment and control groups, divorces increased from the mid 1990s to the time
of the reform (top left panel). Contrary to the discussion of Section 3 on the possible
strategic effect in response to the reform announcement, we do not observe any sharp
increase in the number of divorces immediately after the introduction of the reform. In
fact, from the introduction of joint custody onwards, divorces decreased amongst treated-
group couples, while they continued to increase amongst control-group couples.
In the case of marriage (top right panel), we observe an increasing trend for the control
group over the whole sample period, whereas the declining secular trend among treated
couples was reversed after the introduction of the reform. The bottom left panel displays
the trends in marital and nonmarital births starting from July 1998, because that was the
time when Germany introduced joint child custody as the default custody arrangement.
Births (whether marital or nonmarital) have declined over time, especially in Bavaria.




To examine the effect of the reform on female employment, we use individual quarterly
data from the ASSD between January 1995 and December 2005. For each quarter we
have labor force status information on more than 2 million women aged between 16 and
55, for a total of about 54 million observations.
We estimate a variant of model (1) in which the new outcome variable, yit, is equal to
1 if woman i is employed in quarter t, and is equal to 0 otherwise, while the new treatment
variable, Tit is equal to 1 for all women with dependent children or women aged 45 or less,
and is equal to 0 for women aged more than 45 without dependent children. Following the
discussion of Section 3, a negative value of the treatment effect β is consistent with the
notion that the reform led families to undertake greater marriage specific investments.
The bottom right panel of Figure 2 shows that, irrespective of treatment status, female
employment rates rose from the beginning of the sample period up to 80–82 percent in
the middle of 2000, declined sharply down to 72–74 percent over the next two years,
and remained fairly flat thereafter. Although the employment rate fell just before the
introduction of the reform as a result of the 2000/2001 recession, both treatment and
control groups seemed to have been similarly affected.
Court Data
We have another unique data source that permits us to examine parents’ interactions at
the time of (and after) divorce. This is given by court records on approximately 7,000
divorces, which were initiated between 1997 and 2003 and completed by May 2004. Such
data come from official divorce records compiled by 5 district courts in Austria that have
full jurisdiction over divorce proceedings.20
This data set contains information on partner-specific age, education, citizenship,
income, and number of previous marriages. For each dissolving marriage we also know
the length of the marriage, the duration of the divorce proceedings, the type of other
support obligations for each divorcing partner (both towards former spouses and towards
children born in earlier unions), whether any party hired a lawyer, a judge identifier and
the sex of the judge (to whom couples are randomly matched).21 Court outcomes include
20The courts are Hall, Kitzbu¨hel, Kufstein, Linz, and the Vienna district of Favoriten. Over the sample
period, we have information on all divorces in Hall and Kitzbu¨hel (which comprise more rural areas), 90
percent of all divorces in Kufstein, and 80 percent of all divorces in Linz and Favoriten in Vienna (which
refer to more populated urban areas).
21It is worth stressing that, irrespective of the 2001 reform, over 90 percent of divorces are by mutual
consent and the information on which partner initiated the divorce case is thus not collected.
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alimony and child support payments, the overall length of the divorce process (in days),
and the likelihood of post-divorce trials.22
Treatment effects and their identification differ across outcomes. For alimony pay-
ments (incidence and amount) and the length of the divorce process we estimate the
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the introduction of the reform as well as the local aver-
age treatment effect (LATE) of the actual assignment of joint custody. Instead, for child
support payments (incidence and amount), we can only identify the latter effect.
Since alimony payments and length of the divorce process are observed for all di-
vorcing couples, regardless of whether they had children or not, we can estimate a DiD
specification of the form
yit = α0 + α1Tit + α2I(t ≥ s) + (α31 + α32Tit)δt + β1I(t ≥ s)Tit + X′γ1 + εit, (2)
where the subscript i denotes a dissolving couple (or, interchangeably, the father and
mother in the couple) at time t. As in (1), equation (2) allows for group-specific time
trends. The new treatment variable, Tit, is equal to 1 if the divorcing couple has at least
one dependent child, and is equal to 0 otherwise. More precisely, we perform separate
analyses with two different control groups. One is defined by all households that do not
have dependent children (control group 1), either because they are childless or because
their children are older. The other is defined only by households in which the youngest
child is 18 years old or older (control group 2).
The effect of interest is captured by β1, which measures the effect of the 2001 reform
that is shared by all divorcing couples, irrespective of their custody arrangements, and
thus identifies an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Estimates of β1 > 0 in the case of
alimony payments and estimates of β1<0 in the case of the length of the divorce process
will support the notion of greater marriage specific investments. Opposite estimates will
be taken as evidence in support of a lower investment. Values of β1 equal to zero, instead,
will be consistent with Becker-Coase bargains.
Unlike the previous outcomes, child support payments (incidence and amount) are
observed only for couples with children. Thus, for this outcome — and for completeness
also for the case of alimony payments and divorce process length — we estimate models
22Weiss and Willis (1993) discuss important issues related to the data on alimony and child support
payments, such as the conversion of flows to stocks, incomplete information on payment flows beyond the
sample period and the time variation in legal obligations and actual payments. In our empirical work we
abstract from these issues.
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of the form
yit = a0 + a1δt + β2Jit + X
′γ2 + it, (3)
where Jit is an indicator function that equals 1 if the divorcing parents settle on joint
custody, and equals 0 otherwise. The effect of interest in (3) is β2, which measures the
effect of the actual joint custody allocation. Its identification is made possible, with data
covering only the post-reform period by those families that opt for joint custody upon
divorce.
Although the reform has made joint custody the dominant arrangement, settling on
joint custody is endogenous to the extent that it requires divorcing spouses to agree on
the main aspects of the divorce arrangement. Put differently, JCit might share some
common process with the unobservables that underpin yit. Because of this, we estimate
(3) by two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumenting Jit with judge indicators. Judges,
in fact, might have different views on joint custody and different inclinations to dispense
it.23 We take advantage of the fact that the assignment of a divorcing couple to a judge
is random, based on the first letter of the husband’s surname. This then will allow us to
identify the local average treatment effect (LATE) of joint custody for ‘compliers’, i.e.,
those couples with dependent children who were exposed to the reform and, following the
judge’s recommendation, opted for joint custody.
A potential problem with this approach is that judges might have an effect not only
on the likelihood of a joint custody arrangement but also on the outcome itself, e.g.,
the amount of child support and alimony payments. To account for this possibility we
consider an additional specification in which we also include judge specific effects, which
are obtained from outcome specific regressions on judge dummy variables.24
As shown, among others, by Angrist et al. (1996) and Angrist (2006), the ITT es-
timate, captured by β1 in (2), and the β2 LATE estimate in (3) are straightforwardly
linked. In particular, the former is re-scaled by the sample of compliers in the treatment
group, implicitly assuming that those who did not comply received a zero impact from
the reform. That is, letting Π(y) be the compliance rate in the original treatment group
for outcome y, then β2(y) = β1(y)/Π(y). Thus, in spite of their different nature and the
different structure they impose on the data, the two estimates capture meaningful aspects
23There is no evidence (whether hard or anectodal) that judges systematically changed their views on
child custody as a result of the reform.
24In fact, to gain further variation, we performed four different of such regressions stratified by wife’s
age, so that we have four different coefficients per judge. Our substantive results, in any case, are
insensitive to whether we use four or fewer coefficients.
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of the causal impact of the custody reform on couples’ behavior. We shall see — for al-
imony payments and the length of the divorce process — whether such a relationship is
borne out by our data.
A positive estimate of β2 in the case of alimony and child support payments, and a
negative estimate in the case of the length of the divorce process and the likelihood of
post-divorce trials will, in general, support the story of greater marriage specific invest-
ments. More specifically, our interpretation of a positive β2, which according to (3) can
be estimated only after marriages have been dissolved, is that fathers make their post-
divorce investments in a way that they are in line with those made within marriage. An
opposite (negative) sign of β2 will support the notion of joint custody leading to lower
marital investments, while estimates of β2 equal to zero will be in line with Becker-Coase
bargains.
But the story behind β2 could be more complex for at least three reasons. First,
alimony and child support payments may be perceived (both by parents and by judges)
as close substitutes. In this case, it is possible that nonresidential parents increase one type
of expenditure and decrease the other. Second, after the reform, nonresidential parents are
likely to spend more resources on their children as a result of joint custody. Judges could
then internalize this possibility and deliberately set lower child support orders.25 Third,
as in Weiss and Willis (1985), nonresidential parents may suffer a partial loss of control
over allocative decisions of residential parents. As a result, they might prefer to reduce
child support transfers, given that joint custody allows them to share time and resources
with their children and thus helps reduce the Pareto loss induced by divorce. The results
for β2 therefore will have to be interpreted looking at all the outcomes together. This is
an additional compelling reason as to why we estimate (3) also for alimony payments and
the length of the divorce process.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the court data outcomes and of the variables
contained in the vector X in (2) and (3) and used in the analysis, before and after the
reform and by treatment status.26 Before and after the reform, the incidence of alimony
25Indeed, the Austrian divorce law provides flexible guidelines to judges on how much the nonresidential
parent should pay the other parent for child support.
26The table shows we have a total of 3,533 couples with dependent children at the time of divorce in
the treatment group and 2,929 couples in control group 1 and 570 in control group 2. Despite the smaller
sample size, control group 2 is likely to be comprised of couples whose wives are more comparable to the
those included in the treatment group in terms of the court’s appraisals of alimony and child support
payments. Notice that, from the whole sample, we exclude divorces occurred among couples who married
after the reform (115 couples), divorces that ended with non-parental custody arrangements (25 couples)
as well as cases where the wife pays alimony to the husband (6 observations). We also exclude 384
observations due to missing information on at least one of the outcomes or explanatory variables. After
such selection criteria, we have a sample of 6,462 couples for our analysis on the treatment group and
control group 1.
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transfers remained at about 19 percent among treatment households but declined slightly
among households without children (from 12 to 9 percent) and sharply among households
with older children (from 41 to 27 percent), while the monetary amount of alimony pay-
ments went up, but proportionally more so for households in the treatment group. After
the reform, the length in the divorce process rose across all groups, with families with
older children facing the steepest increase, whereas the fraction of treatment households
experiencing further trials after divorce declined. The incidence of child support payments
also declined among divorcing couples with dependent children, while the amount of child
support payments increased by almost 15 percent to e 267 per month. Unsurprisingly,
households with older children have also older mothers and fathers, whose marriages have
lasted substantially longer than those of the households in the other two groups. Hus-
bands in such older households have higher incomes, but wife’s incomes are fairly similar
across groups. The low fraction of men and women with university degrees or higher
qualifications is well known for older cohorts in Austria and it has been documented in
other studies (e.g., Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer, 1999; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004).
5 Register and Social Security Data Results
Benchmark Estimates
The main estimates obtained from the three registers and the ASSD data are summarized
in Table 2. In the first column, the treatment effect estimate for the divorce outcome re-
veals that the reform significantly reduced the number of divorces by 8.3 percent (SE=2.4
percent), which implies around 3,400 fewer divorces (95% CI=[–5,300; –1500]) over the
post-reform sample period.
The second column indicates that the reform led to a significant increase in the number
of marriages of 3.8 percent (SE=1.7 percent). This means that the reform induced approx-
imately 5,500 additional marriages (with a 95% confidence interval of about 650–10,900
extra marriages) from its introduction until the end of 2005.
The birth outcome results are reported in the next two columns. We find evidence of
a significant increase of 2.8 percent (SE=0.9 percent) in the number of births within mar-
riage (third column), representing an increment of about 6,300 (95% CI=[2,300; 10,300])
babies born within marital unions as a result of the reform between July 2001 and the end
of 2005. The treatment effect estimate on the number of out-of-wedlock births (fourth
column) is instead lower and statistically insignificant (β=1.3 percent, SE=1.3 percent).
Finally, the reform led to a significant reduction in female employment by 2.3 per-
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centage points (fourth column), which corresponds to almost 38,000 fewer jobs held by
women during the post-reform period.
Taken together, therefore, these results offer evidence of non-Coasean bargains and
are consistent with a mechanism driven by a redistribution of resources that favors men.
By giving fathers a joint custody option, the reform provided men (and women) with a
propensity for marriage specific investments greater incentives to marry and have children
while married. Such marriages, in turn, have become more stable and fewer divorces
are observed. One of the results of the lower divorce risk was greater intrahousehold
specialization, as documented by lower female employment.
Sensitivity Analysis
We test the robustness of our benchmark treatment effect estimates to a number of al-
ternative specifications. The results are summarized in Figure 3, which, for convenience,
also reports the benchmark estimates for each outcome (in the left-hand side column of
each panel).
In the case of divorce (top left panel), we examine the sensitivity of our benchmark
regressions to either a shorter or a longer post-reform periods (second and third bar, re-
spectively). The results vary slightly, but retain both the sign and significance of our ear-
lier estimates. While the benchmark least squares estimates implicitly give equal weight
to each of the districts, we also found a similar, marginally larger, effect using population-
weighted least squares regressions (fourth bar). Pre-dating the reform to September 2000
also leads to a treatment effect estimate that is virtually identical to the corresponding
benchmark estimate (not shown for convenience), suggesting little scope for announce-
ment effects. Finally, to separate the effect of the reform on divorce from differential
selection into marriage, we re-estimated the model using only marriages formed before
the reform. The treatment effect on this subsample, reported in the last bar of this panel,
is statistically indistinguishable from the one reported in Table 2, indicating that the
changing composition of married couples due to selection into marriage could not explain
the divorce results.
For marriage, the top right panel of the figure shows that changing the length of the
sample by either omitting or including one year in the post-reform period does not alter
our results (second and third bar, respectively). This holds true even if the window is ±2
years. Weighted regressions (in which the weights are defined by the size of the population
in each district) also yield similar results. Further, we checked our results against different
definitions of the treatment group. For instance, we redefined the treatment group as
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married couples comprising women aged 40 or less or married couples in which women
had children before marriage. We always found estimates (not shown) that are close to
those presented in Table 2.
When we reduce the sample to only bordering districts (45 districts in Bavaria and 19
in Austria), the estimated effect of joint custody on marital births is still positive and of
the same size as the benchmark estimate (see the second bar of the bottom left panel),
but it is no longer statistically significant. Using population-weighted regressions and pre-
dating the introduction of the reform to September 2000 when the Austrian Parliament
started the first public discussions on the custody reform deliver larger treatment effect
estimates on marital births (third and fourth bar), while changing the definition of the
post-reform period does not affect the results (not shown).
Finally, lengthening or shortening the post-reform period does not alter the treatment
effect results on employment (second and third bar of the bottom right panel). Our base-
line estimate might reflect differences in responses to labor market changes that do not
depend on the introduction of the custody reform. To account for such differential re-
sponses, we use group-specific district level unemployment rates as additional controls. As
shown in the fourth bar, the estimated treatment effect estimate is essentially unchanged.
This is also the case if the pre-reform period is pre-dated to September 2000 (not shown).
We also checked robustness by lowering the age cutoff for the definition of treatment and
control groups from to 40 years of age. This is to account for the observation discussed
in Section 3, according to which women of different age or with different family obliga-
tions might have responded differently to the 2000/2001 recession. The estimate of –1.9
percent (SE=0.04 percent) are economically identical to those found with the baseline
specification.
In sum, therefore, we retain the same interpretation proposed earlier. The overall
evidence found with the sensitivity analysis is that the joint custody reform led to intra-
household bargaining which favored men giving them greater incentives to invest within
marriage.
6 Evidence on Post-Divorce Outcomes
Table 3 reports the estimates obtained from the civil courts data. Panel A shows the
results from two versions of model (2), one in which the control group is given by divorcing
couples without dependent children (specification (i)), the other in which the control group
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is given by couples with children aged 18 or more (specification (ii)).27 Panel B instead
presents the 2SLS estimates from (3). For this panel, the estimates presented under
specification (iv) do account for outcome specific judge effects, while the estimates in
specification (iii) do not.28
Looking first at panel A, we find evidence that the reform increased the likelihood of
the wife receiving alimony payments from her ex-partner by almost 13 percentage points
(specification (ii)). This represents a quantitatively large impact, boosting the baseline
probability of alimony payments by almost 60 percent. In specification (i), instead, where
the control group consists of all couples without dependent children, the same effect is
again positive but not statistically significant. The greater significance level found with
specification (ii) is not surprising: as mentioned in Section 4 the control group used in
specification (ii) is comprised of couples whose wives are more likely to be comparable
to those included in the treatment group in terms of alimony salient characteristics from
the courts’ viewpoint. The reform had also a strong positive impact on the amount
of alimony transfers from fathers to mothers, ranging from e 207 to e 346 extra per
month (specifications (i) and (ii) respectively), implying a twofold increase at least over
the average baseline transfer. We also find a negative impact on the length of the overall
divorce process. The estimated effect of 6 days reported in specification (ii) is substantial,
representing a 10 percent reduction from the sample mean, but it is not statistically
significant.
This evidence, therefore, partly confirms the interpretation we have given to our earlier
findings. The results on alimony payments uphold the notion that the shift to joint
custody was associated with a relatively greater marriage specific paternal investment
and, possibly, with the realization of marital shocks that favored the husband. Instead,
the lack of statistical significance for the estimates on the length of the divorce process and
for the likelihood of post-divorce trials (not shown) suggests that Becker-Coase bargains
may not be too far off the mark for such outcomes. The direction of these effects, however,
is still consistent with intrahousehold bargaining driven by a greater paternal investment,
and their magnitude indicates the potential for a substantial impact.
We repeated the whole analysis after stratifying the sample by wife’s age into two
groups (couples with the woman aged 35 or less and couples with the woman aged more
than 35) and found no difference in the treatment effect estimates between the two groups.
27As discussed at the end of Section 3, we cannot rule out that these estimates partly reflect composi-
tional changes.
28All the estimates shown in Table 3 are obtained from regressions that control for all the variables in
X in (2) and (3) and listed in Table 1, except for husband’s and wife’s incomes. Our results, however,
are not sensitive to their inclusion and also are robust to the exclusion of all the other controls.
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Similarly, we performed again the analysis after dropping from the sample the couples in
which the wife has at least a university qualification. We detected no significant estimate
heterogeneity along any of the outcomes under study.
The LATE estimates in panel B show that accounting for the endogeneity of the joint
custody decision provides us with evidence which is similar to that found in panel A for
alimony payments, length of the divorce process and the likelihood of post-divorce trials.
In each case, the F test on the instrument is about ten and tends to be higher when we
control for judge-specific effects that vary across outcome variables and wife’s age groups.
Again, the probability that the ex-wife receives alimony transfers is positive, large, and
significant, irrespective of whether judge specific effects are accounted for or not. For
instance, the 2SLS estimate of specification (iv) implies a large impact, increasing the
baseline probability of 14 percent by more than 50 percent. Interestingly, recalling our
discussion in Section 4 and noting that the compliance rate for alimony is Π(alimony)=
0.44, the LATE estimate β2 for alimony in specification (iv) yields a value of 9.5 when
rescaled by Π(y), for which we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis of equality with
the 12.5 estimate of the ITT effect reported in panel A. We take this as robust evidence
that increases confidence in our estimates.
Similarly, alimony transfers more than doubled from e 94 to about e 206–e 209 per
month. Although larger in absolute value than before, the effect on the length of the
divorce process is again negative and statistically insignificant. In line with our previous
discussions, therefore, these results broadly support the notion of non-Coasean bargains
accompanied with greater parental investments.29
This, however, is not the case when we consider child support payments. For this
outcome, in fact, we find that the reform led to a reduction in child support payments by
e 41–e 46 per month, which correspond to a 20 percent decline with respect to the average
monthly transfer. These effects, however, are not statistically significant at conventional
levels.30 This reduction is not in line with the presence of Becker-Coase bargains. But it
is also inconsistent with a mechanism driven by greater parental investment, according to
which we would have observed an increase in the contribution made by the father. When
we look at the incidence of child support payments we also find a negative effect, but the
magnitude of this effect is smaller and never statistically significant.
As anticipated in Section 4, however, the interpretation of β2 is more complex and
29As before, we find no evidence of treatment effect estimate heterogeneity by wife’s age and education.
30Notice that the evidence from least squares estimates (not reported for simplicity) is of a positive,
albeit statistically insignificant, effect. The negative impact measured by the estimates shown in Table
3 therefore underlines the possible correlation between the unobservables that generate child custody
payments and the parents’ decision to settle on joint custody.
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needs to be assessed looking at all outcomes together. As mentioned, alimony and child
support payments might be perceived as substitutable with each other; and judges might
deliberately reduce child support orders given that fathers are likely to face greater child
expenditures as a result of the joint custody award and they are also likely to face greater
alimony payments. To get an insight into this possible substitution, we then consider
the total amount of transfers which include both alimony payments and child support
payments together (A+CS column). The evidence is that the reform led to a substantial
increase in this total transfer regardless of the definition of control group and of the type
of estimation (Del Boca and Ribero 1998). The 2SLS estimates of additional e 163 and
e 191 per month represent respectively an increase of nearly 50 and 60 percent in total
transfers received by the mother, who is the parent responsible for the physical custody.
As a whole, therefore, these estimates are in line with non-Coasean bargains based on a
redistributive mechanism that favored fathers and gave them greater incentives to invest
in marriage specific capital.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the effects of the introduction of joint custody of children after
divorce in Austria on family behavior within and outside marriage. Our results rest,
for the first time, on the evidence from a number of extraordinarily rich data sources.
We use divorce, marriage, and birth registers as well as administrative social security
data covering the whole population to look at divorce, marriage, births, and female labor
market participation. We also use unique family court records to study the effect of the
reform on several post-divorce outcomes. The results are interpreted within a simple
framework that allows us to tests whether Becker-Coase bargains characterize family
behavior or not. If the ex-post custody allocations affect that share of marital surplus
that each spouse can appropriate, then this in turn determines each spouse’s investment
incentive. Alternatives to Becker-Coase bargains, therefore, can be underpinned either by
a world in which fathers make more marital investments as a result of the custody reform
or by an environment characterized by a combination of relatively lower marriage specific
paternal investments and the realization of marital shocks that favor the mother.
Along all margins of behavior, we find evidence against Becker-Coase bargains and
in support of the mechanism driven by greater parental investments. In particular, our
estimates show that the reform significantly reduced divorce and female employment rates
and significantly increased marriage and marital birth rates. Similarly, the reform led to
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a substantial and statistically significant increase in the total private transfers received by
mothers after divorce, with the (legally justifiable and statistically insignificant) reduction
in child support payments being more than offset by the huge increase in alimony payments
from their former partners.
At a policy level, the implications of our results are potentially far-reaching. The
fact that family decisions respond to the introduction of joint custody arrangements both
within and outside marital unions suggests the possibility of an important interaction be-
tween the legal environment surrounding the family and socially relevant family behaviors.
The effects on marriages, divorces, births, and female paid work are strong indications
of a substantial adjustment of individual family members to the reform. Likewise, the
changes in post-divorce money transfers from fathers to mothers provide evidence of how
the amount of resources available to children might vary as a result of the reform. Since
many public programs are designed to protect families in general and, especially, children
within them, it is important to know whether and how individuals within households
change their behavior in response to family law reforms.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables in the Court Data
Control group 1 Control group 2 Treated
Before After Before After Before After
Outcome variables
Share with alimony award (%) 11.84 9.23 40.68 27.02 18.89 18.69
Alimony (e per month) 827.64 872.63 857.35 978.00 630.85 742.91
Length (days) 71.35 77.30 66.67 82.55 63.62 71.95
Share with child support award (%) 90.45 86.73
Child support (e per month) 235.16 266.91
Share with post-divorce trial (%) 28.44 16.02
Wife’s characteristics
Age 39.02 40.43 50.54 49.91 35.00 36.34
(11.08) (10.47) (7.07) (6.40) (6.30) (6.18)
Has no university degree 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97
Monthly income (in e 100) 6.72 7.00 6.30 7.08 6.32 6.59
(2.75) (2.37) (3.17) (2.62) (3.53) (3.21)
Born in Austria 0.80 0.75 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.83
Number of marriages 1.36 1.35 1.11 1.08 1.12 1.10
(0.69) (0.63) (0.35) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32)
Husband’s characteristics
Age 40.93 42.52 52.65 52.84 37.97 38.99
(11.31) (11.06) (6.96) (6.79) (7.39) (7.02)
Has no university degree 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95
Monthly income (in e 100) 14.15 13.97 16.01 15.47 14.82 15.98
(4.37) (4.04) (6.27) (4.01) (6.27) (6.78)
Born in Austria 0.79 0.76 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.82
Number of marriages 1.33 1.33 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.13
(0.64) (0.63) (0.33) (0.37) (0.40) (0.37)
Marriage duration (years) 10.21 11.62 26.98 26.25 10.65 11.23
(10.36) (10.48) (7.87) (7.86) (6.18) (5.94)
Number of children 0.30 0.39 1.71 1.73 0.07 0.12
aged 18 or more (0.73) (0.81) (0.80) (0.79) (0.32) (0.38)
Child’s age 9.96 10.38
(5.09) (4.77)
Observations 1,824 1,105 322 248 2,388 1,145
Sum 2,929 570 3,533
Notes: Figures are means and standard deviations (in parentheses, for continuous variables only). ‘Control group 1’ comprises
all divorcing couples without dependent children at the time of divorce. ‘Control group 2’ is given by the sub-group of couples in
control group 1 that have children aged 18 or more. ‘Treatment group’ is given by all divorcing couples with dependent children at
the time of divorce.
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ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
g
ro
u
p
is
m
a
d
e
u
p
o
f
w
o
m
en
a
g
ed
4
5
o
r
m
o
re
w
it
h
o
u
t
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
g
ro
u
p
is
d
efi
n
ed
b
y
w
o
m
en
a
g
ed
le
ss
th
a
n
4
5
o
r
b
y
w
o
m
en
(o
f
a
n
y
a
g
e)
w
it
h
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
.
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
w
o
m
a
n
’s
a
g
e
a
n
d
a
g
e
sq
u
a
re
d
,
h
er
p
a
st
la
b
o
r
m
a
rk
et
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
(m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
to
ta
l
m
o
n
th
s
in
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t)
,
a
n
d
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l-
le
v
el
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
W
e
in
cl
u
d
e
q
u
a
rt
er
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
ra
th
er
th
a
n
m
o
n
th
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
f
D
is
tr
ic
t
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
a
re
co
ll
in
ea
r
w
it
h
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
g
ro
u
p
in
d
ic
a
to
r.
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b
u
st
n
e
ss
C
h
e
ck
s
fo
r
th
e
R
e
g
is
te
r
a
n
d
S
o
ci
a
l
S
e
cu
ri
ty
D
a
ta
R
e
su
lt
s
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o
te
s:
E
st
im
a
te
s
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
w
it
h
th
e
b
a
rs
.
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h
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p
re
se
n
t
th
e
p
er
ce
n
t
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
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iv
o
rc
es
,
m
a
rr
ia
g
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,
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a
ri
ta
l
a
n
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n
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n
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ta
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b
ir
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s,
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n
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th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
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ch
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n
g
e
in
th
e
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
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ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
a
s
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re
su
lt
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th
e
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t
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st
o
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re
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rm
.
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e
w
h
is
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er
s
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r
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o
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5
p
er
ce
n
t
co
n
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d
en
ce
in
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ro
b
u
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d
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in
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r
h
et
er
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u
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.
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le
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e
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n
el
re
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o
rt
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es
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n
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in
g
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se
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n
e
es
ti
m
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te
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a
b
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.
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o
p
le
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p
a
n
el
(d
iv
o
rc
es
)
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p
o
rt
s
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ea
tm
en
t
eff
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t
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fo
u
n
d
w
it
h
a
sh
o
rt
er
sa
m
p
le
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o
n
d
b
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r)
,
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lo
n
g
er
sa
m
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le
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ir
d
b
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o
p
u
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o
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
le
a
st
sq
u
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re
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ti
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a
ti
o
n
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o
u
rt
h
b
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r)
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n
d
a
sa
m
p
le
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m
p
ri
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n
g
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n
ly
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ef
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rr
ia
g
es
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b
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ri
g
h
t
p
a
n
el
(m
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rr
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g
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)
re
p
o
rt
s
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ea
tm
en
t
eff
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t
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fo
u
n
d
w
it
h
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sh
o
rt
er
sa
m
p
le
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ec
o
n
d
b
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r)
,
a
lo
n
g
er
sa
m
p
le
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h
ir
d
b
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r)
,
a
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
le
a
st
sq
u
a
re
s
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
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u
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h
b
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d
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ep
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d
en
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ch
il
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re
n
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o
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b
a
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b
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p
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p
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b
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o
n
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g
h
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d
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u
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m
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d
b
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b
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o
u
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h
b
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B
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g
h
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el
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lo
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t
eff
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t
es
ti
m
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u
n
d
w
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h
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m
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b
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n
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le
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h
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b
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ro
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c
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te
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l
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tr
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b
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d
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b
a
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p
p
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p
p
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d
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e
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.3
4
9.
35
11
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E
st
im
a
te
s
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p
a
n
el
A
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
si
n
g
le
-e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
n
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
b
ef
o
re
a
n
d
a
ft
er
th
e
re
fo
rm
(s
ee
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(2
))
.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
g
ro
u
p
in
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
(i
)
is
d
efi
n
ed
b
y
d
iv
o
rc
in
g
co
u
p
le
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
a
t
th
e
ti
m
e
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
e.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
g
ro
u
p
in
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
(i
i)
is
d
efi
n
ed
b
y
th
e
g
ro
u
p
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
in
g
co
u
p
le
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
b
u
t
w
it
h
ch
il
d
re
n
a
g
ed
1
8
o
r
m
o
re
.
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b
o
th
ca
se
s,
tr
ea
tm
en
t
g
ro
u
p
is
g
iv
en
b
y
d
iv
o
rc
in
g
co
u
p
le
s
w
it
h
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
.
E
st
im
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te
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n
el
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re
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b
ta
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ed
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2
S
L
S
re
g
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ss
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n
s
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n
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u
p
le
s
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h
o
h
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v
e
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ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
re
n
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n
d
d
iv
o
rc
ed
a
ft
er
th
e
re
fo
rm
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ee
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ti
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n
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.
T
h
e
en
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o
g
en
o
u
s
v
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ri
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b
le
in
d
ic
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ti
n
g
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h
et
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er
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e
sp
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u
se
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a
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ed
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n
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st
o
d
y
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rr
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n
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en
t
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r
n
o
t
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in
a
ry
v
a
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a
b
le
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is
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
b
y
se
ct
io
n
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u
d
g
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s.
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co
n
tr
a
st
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sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
(i
ii
),
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
(i
v
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
a
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o
fo
r
ju
d
g
e-
sp
ec
ifi
c
eff
ec
ts
th
a
t
v
a
ry
a
cr
o
ss
o
u
tc
o
m
e
v
a
ri
a
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le
s
a
n
d
b
ri
d
es
’
a
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ro
u
p
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J
u
d
g
e-
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ec
ifi
c
eff
ec
ts
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re
d
er
iv
ed
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s
fo
ll
o
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B
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se
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o
n
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ll
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n
tr
o
l
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n
d
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te
d
)
co
u
p
le
s
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o
m
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e
p
er
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b
ef
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re
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e
re
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rm
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te
ea
ch
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g
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ec
ifi
c
eff
ec
t
fo
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ea
ch
o
u
tc
o
m
e
b
y
b
ri
d
es
’
a
g
e
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.e
.,
fo
u
r
eq
u
a
l
si
ze
d
g
ro
u
p
s)
.
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p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r,
fo
r
ea
ch
ea
ch
g
ro
u
p
,
w
e
re
g
re
ss
ea
ch
o
u
tc
o
m
e
o
n
a
ll
ju
d
g
e
d
u
m
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ie
s
a
n
d
u
se
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e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
o
u
tc
o
m
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a
g
e-
sp
ec
ifi
c
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d
g
e
eff
ec
ts
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s
a
n
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
in
th
e
2
S
L
S
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ti
m
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ti
o
n
.
In
b
o
th
p
a
n
el
s,
ea
ch
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
co
n
tr
o
ls
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r
a
se
t
o
f
fu
rt
h
er
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v
a
ri
a
te
s
co
m
p
ri
si
n
g
w
if
e’
s
a
n
d
h
u
sb
a
n
d
’s
a
g
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ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
co
u
n
tr
y
o
f
b
ir
th
,
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
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rr
ia
g
es
,
th
ei
r
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
,
th
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r
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
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in
o
rs
,
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n
d
th
e
h
u
sb
a
n
d
’s
fu
rt
h
er
su
p
p
o
rt
o
b
li
g
a
ti
o
n
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o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
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ll
o
w
in
g
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
o
f
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
fo
rm
in
p
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n
th
es
es
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D
ep
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d
en
t
v
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ri
a
b
le
is
eq
u
a
l
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o
n
e
if
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e
re
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iv
es
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si
ti
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e
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w
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n
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th
er
w
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ig
u
re
s
g
iv
e
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
ch
a
n
g
e
fr
o
m
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n
ea
r
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ro
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b
il
it
y
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o
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el
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el
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a
n
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L
S
m
o
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el
s
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a
n
el
B
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D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
a
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m
o
n
y
p
a
y
m
en
t.
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ig
u
re
s
g
iv
e
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
ch
a
n
g
e
in
E
u
ro
s
fr
o
m
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o
b
it
re
g
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ss
io
n
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o
d
el
s
(p
a
n
el
A
)
a
n
d
2
S
L
S
m
o
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el
s
(p
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n
el
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).
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D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
ch
il
d
re
ce
iv
es
a
p
o
si
ti
v
e
a
w
a
rd
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n
d
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th
er
w
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e.
F
ig
u
re
s
g
iv
e
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
ch
a
n
g
e
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o
m
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S
L
S
m
o
d
el
s.
F
u
rt
h
er
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
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re
ch
il
d
’s
a
g
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il
d
’s
in
co
m
e,
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n
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n
in
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to
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o
f
w
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et
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er
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d
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r
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v
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b
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ig
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e
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te
d
ch
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n
g
e
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fr
o
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L
S
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d
el
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p
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o
te
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a
b
le
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e
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e
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iv
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e
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ro
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d
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e
th
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es
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te
d
ch
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n
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e
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L
S
re
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s
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n
el
A
)
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2
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L
S
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o
d
el
s
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n
el
B
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F
u
rt
h
er
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tr
o
ls
in
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u
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ti
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a
ti
o
n
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re
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b
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ep
en
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t
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a
b
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)
p
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